Amicus interventions were first documented in 14 th century England, 13 but they remained infrequent until the 19 th century, when the function of amicus began to develop in common law jurisdictions as a means of ensuring the representation of third-party rights, which in an adversarial process are often left unprotected. 14 Krislov makes the following observation regarding this development: 15 While the courts continued to cling to the proposition that the amicus was a detached servant of the court -'he acts for no one, but simply seeks to give information to the court' [footnote omitted] -his services no longer precluded commitment to a cause. Indeed, the very notion of his acting for no one was belied by his rising to do just the opposite-in many instances to act directly and officially as counsel for one not formally a party to the case.
The subsequent evolution of the amicus function in legal systems such as the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, 16 Most forums are open to at least some form of amicus participation. While the ICJ Statute can hardly be described as fertile procedural ground for would-be amici,
the ICJ is open in principle to receiving amicus briefs from 'public international organizations' in contentious cases (although it does so rarely, and has interpreted the term 'public international organization' to the exclusion of NGOs). 38 The ICJ model is predicated on the broader rationale that it is not enough for an amicus to be of assistance; there must also be a 'public interest' imperative to warrant participation.
39
In proceedings before the ICJ, the public interest requirement is very tightly construed. 40 Academic amici cannot even get a foot in the door, let alone entertain the prospect that the ICJ might engage with the substance of their submissions.
41
Other courts and tribunals adopt a more permissive approach. to represent a public constituency, beyond the limited claim that they are members of the public themselves. However, this has not stopped them from seeking to infiltrate the procedural space that has been opened up by the drive towards greater public involvement in international adjudicative processes. Often they seek to do so by 'piggy-backing' onto the advocacy-oriented submissions of NGOs and law clinics. 43 Increasingly, however, they seek to intervene qua academics. Before examining the practice in the latter area, we will consider some of the implications of this development from a theoretical perspective.
For reasons we explain below, the traditional dynamic between scholarship and the international adjudicative function is very much adjudicator-driven, but it is also premised on the notion that international law scholarship is a judicial resource of considerable value. Our basic contention is that the emergence of the academic amicus on the international plane has the potential to disrupt, but also enrich, this traditional dynamic.
In cases involving international law, the positive law can be relatively thin;
judges are frequently required to discern rules from a morass of state practice and . 46 The more scope scholars have to participate as amici, the less adjudicators are able to control the initiation and terms of the dialogue. In the new landscape, scholarship is no longer a static resource for adjudicators to draw upon.
Instead, it is being pushed actively onto the judges' desks. If the upward trend in academic amicus participation continues, it will result in more work for international courts and tribunals, especially those which -unlike the ICJ -actively consider all unsolicited amicus briefs before deciding whether to accept or reject them (like NAFTA tribunals or the ICTY).
47
The increased prominence of academic amici also raises questions of quality control. The identification of the 'most highly qualified publicists of the various nations' involves a degree of subjectivity, but it generally results in the consultation of a confined list of 'authorities' 48 who are widely considered to be persuasive and unless their authors seek to publish them elsewhere. Furthermore, where a procedural record exists to the effect that a submission has been considered and rejected, it is rare for reasons to be given, let alone detailed reasons. It is nevertheless possible to derive certain insights from the growing body of practice.
While the most interesting developments concern the judicial reception of unsolicited briefs, the most productive form of dialogue between the academic and judicial spheres occurs when expert amici are invited by courts and tribunals to provide scholarly expertise. It is to this aspect of the practice that we turn first.
The invited academic amicus
Given the status accorded to international law scholarship in the judicial decisionmaking process, it is unsurprising that courts and tribunals have found it valuable on occasion to invite scholars of international law to participate in proceedings as amici. 56 The participation of these scholars is closely aligned with the role of the expert amicus as traditionally conceived -that is to say, as a disinterested friend of . 58 Ibid, para 1. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid, para 2. 61 Ibid. For the reasons that have been given, it is not difficult to accept and gratefully adopt the conclusions reached by Professor Sands who assisted the court as amicus curiae.
63
Later in the judgment, the court adopted Professor Orentlicher's conclusions as its own, quoting from her amicus submission verbatim.
64
The scholar-adjudicator dialogue in this case was clearly productive. However, it
did not amount to a major deviation from the standard 'Article 38' engagement with 'teachings'. The Special Court was firmly in control of the process, deciding whether to invite scholarly expertise, which scholar(s) to invite and which issues were to be addressed. Its reliance on scholarship was -in the language of its procedural rules -'desirable for the proper determination of the case'.
65
By definition, the 'desirability' criterion is much more difficult to satisfy when an amicus brief is unsolicited. Indeed, the degree of engagement with, and reliance on, the submissions of the amici in Taylor is only rarely on display when the submissions are unsolicited. As the following section will show, the scholar-adjudicator dialogue has been somewhat less productive in the case of unsolicited academic submissions. 62 Ibid, para 34. 63 Ibid, para 41. 64 Ibid, para 51. 65 Rule 74 of the SCSL's Rules of Court. Like other international criminal tribunals (e.g. Lebanon, Cambodia) the SCSL takes the wording of its amicus provision from the ICTY. 
The uninvited academic amicus
For reasons of economy, this overview will not focus in detail on the specific legal issues discussed in the academic submissions under scrutiny. Rather, it will focus on the nature of the interventions and the kind of judicial reception they received. One possible explanation for this frosty judicial reception can be found in the objection of several WTO member states to the involvement of amici (generally) in proceedings held by the AB. The objection is that, as appeals before the AB are only permitted on questions of law, and as the members of the AB are legal experts, the acceptance of amicus briefs seems redundant. 72 This concern appears present in the minds of the adjudicators in one of the rare instances in which a WTO tribunal actually referred to an amicus brief, which had been submitted jointly by a legal clinic and an advocacy group. 73 The Tribunal cited only parts of the brief in which non-WTO law issues were reviewed. 
WTO Tribunals

Investment Tribunals
The role of the amicus in investment arbitration was traditionally conceived of as similar to that of a third-party 'intervener' in the British system, assisting the court while simultaneously giving voice to a public interest. 75 The importance of the public interest being served in the context of amicus participation is emphasized both in the Mr. Appleton is a prominent investment lawyer, not a university academic, but he is -and holds himself out to be in his submission -a renowned expert in the field who has published widely in investment law generally and on NAFTA issues in particular. 79 The carefully reasoned procedural Order of the Tribunal rejecting his application is an unusually comprehensive judicial statement concerning the participation of individual legal experts as amici in investor-state proceedings, and it therefore seems apt to consider the decision in the context of the present study.
Mr. Appleton claimed that, based on his extensive experience and expert knowledge, he could be of service to the Tribunal. 80 More specifically, he claimed that he could provide clarification regarding the meaning of certain investment treaty obligations. 81 He claimed moreover that there was a 'public interest' in permitting his intervention, in the sense that the public has an interest 'in the proper interpretation of Up to this point, it seems clear that the same obstacles would be faced by any individual expert, whether a university academic, a practising lawyer, or an individual with one foot in practice and one in academia. However, it is important to note that Mr. Appleton's professional connections as a practising lawyer militated in important respects against the acceptance of his application. The Tribunal held that: 'It seems that the Applicant's "significant interest" in this arbitration lies only in having this
Tribunal adopt legal interpretations of NAFTA that he favours that could be advantageous to his clients in his pending and possible future NAFTA cases'. 88 In a related finding on the question of 'public interest', the Tribunal held that 'what lies 83 Apotex Procedural Order, supra note 81, at paras 32 and 36. 84 The specific rule in question being section B(6)(a) of the NAFTA FTC Statement. 85 Apotex Procedural Order, supra note 81, at para 31. 86 Ibid, at para 32. 87 Ibid, at para 33. 88 Ibid, at para 40. While the role of the EU Commission in these cases cannot be considered as that of a classic independent expert amicus (as stated by the Elecrabel Tribunal, the EU Commission had 'much more than "a significant interest" in these arbitration proceedings' 95 ), it is clear that in complex fields of law, investment tribunals will sometimes embrace 'scholarly' expertise offered by external actors. Theoretical space appears to exist for amicus participation by scholars who possess the right type of expertise, but it remains to be seen whether this space will be exploited.
The European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been accepting amicus briefs 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Since 1982 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has received more than 500 amicus briefs, mostly from NGOs, individuals, and law school clinics. 101 The IACtHR is arguably the international forum that is most receptive to unsolicited amicus briefs. Its Rules of Procedure are among the most permissive of any international court or tribunal; they stipulate that anyone who wishes to act as amicus may submit a brief at any stage in the proceedings (although within 15 days of a public hearing). 102 Amicus briefs can relate to 'the facts contained in the application or legal considerations over the subject-matter of the proceeding'.
103
The format of amicus briefs in the IACtHR tends to mirror the US practice closely, as does the propensity for submitting briefs on behalf of a large number of signatories. 104 These briefs include 'group' submissions by academic authors, often in conjunction with NGOs and law school clinics. The IACtHR tends to summarize amicus submissions in its decisions, but not engage with them directly in its reasoning. The extent to which the thinking of individual judges is informed by academic amicus submissions is difficult to fathom.
The present authors have attempted to reach out to judges and officials at the IACtHR and other forums on this point via e-mail, to no avail. was submitted by Professor Christine Chinkin, whose stated aim was to 'present legal and policy arguments for supporting claims of non-disclosure to the public and of anonymity from the accused.' 113 The ICTY acknowledged Professor Chinkin's brief in its decision, 114 cited it, and relied on it with respect to several issues. 115 In 1997 the ICTY permitted the submission of thirteen amicus briefs in the Blaskic case, nine of which were submitted by academics without the involvement of any advocacy group. 116 The amici commented on purely legal issues concerning the ICTY's power to issue a subpoena duces tecum to a sovereign state or to governmental officials, and the appropriate remedies in the case of non-compliance with such an order. 117 The ICTY relied on, 118 and engaged with 119 the amicus submissions to a significant extent in its decision.
The ICTY stated that its decision to reach out to the academic community was motivated by 'the importance of the issues' in Blaskic. 120 The briefs that the ICTY eventually received were from renowned scholars and they proved to be a useful resource. As with invited amici, and the traditional approach towards engagement 
